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Abstract
Under the notion of illusory correlations, simple learning paradigms (e.g. Hamilton & 
Gifford, 1976) have been used to study the formation of stereotypes that discriminate between 
majorities and minorities. In the present paper, limitations of this approach in terms of 
theoretical explanations and empirical evidence are addressed. Theoretically, we propose 
pseudocontingencies (PCs, Fiedler, Freytag & Meiser, 2008) as a more robust mechanism 
behind illusory correlations. In contrast to previous explanations, PCs can explain illusory 
correlations when groups are never paired with valence. Empirically, we replicate earlier 
findings, i.e. that the more frequently observed group, the majority, is evaluated more in line 
with the more frequently observed valence. Crucially, we extend the empirical evidence in 
that illusory correlations prove robust over a very large number of observations (320) and 
under increasingly interactive task conditions, involving predictions of valence (Experiment 
2) and reinforcement-learning conditions (Experiment 3). The latter provided evidence for 
illusory correlations on a new measure, participants’ predictions. These predictions reflect the 
expectations about the valence associated with majority and minority and might well affect 
real life behavior. The discussion focuses on possible reasons for why PCs are used in 
stereotypic judgments.
191 words
Keywords: pseudocontingency, skewed base rates, illusory correlation, probabilistic 
contingency learning, reinforcement learning, stereotype formation
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Pseudocontigencies in frequency based illusory correlations
Ever since the seminal work of Hamilton and Gifford (1976) on frequency-based 
illusory correlations (ICs), social psychologists have been intrigued by the notion that group 
stereotypes may simply depend on the distribution of information in the social environment, 
independent of any sentiment or real group conflict. In their experimental analog of stereotype 
formation, participants first observed a series of statements describing positive or negative 
behaviors shown by members of two fictitious groups. The series of stimulus behaviors had 
three key characteristics (e.g. Hamilton & Gifford, 1976, Exp.1): (a) positive behaviors 
appeared more often than negative ones, in 27 and 12 out of 39 instances, respectively, (b) 
one group (i.e., the majority) appeared more often than the other, in 26 and 13 instances, and 
(c) the ratio of positive to negative behaviors was the same (viz., 2:1) for both groups, setting 
the correlation between groups and valence to zero. Therefore, there was no apparent reason 
to evaluate the two groups differentially. Nevertheless, subsequent group impression ratings, 
frequency estimates and recall responses reflected more positive evaluations of the majority 
than the minority. 
This phenomenon of illusory correlation was consistently replicated in numerous 
studies (for a review see Mullen & Johnson, 1990). If positive behaviors prevailed in the 
stimulus series, the majority appeared more positive than the minority. In contrast, if negative 
behaviors prevailed, the majority appeared more negative. In general, an illusory correlation 
was formed between the more frequently presented group and the more prevalent valence. 
To account for this clear-cut evidence on the illusory-correlation phenomenon, different 
theoretical explanations have been offered (Fiedler, 2000). Originally, Hamilton and Gifford 
(1976) had assumed that the most infrequent group-behavior combination (e.g., negative 
minority behavior in the original design with mostly positive behavior) is most distinctive and 
therefore enjoys a memory advantage over the other combinations. This could account for the 
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relatively negative evaluation of the minority. This explanation was not supported in later 
studies using more refined memory analyses (Fiedler, Russer & Gramm, 1993; Klauer & 
Meiser, 2000). These studies instead suggested an explanation in terms of unequal learning 
opportunities, pointing out that (at least) twice as many learning trials are available for the 
majority as for the minority (Smith, 1991; Fiedler, 1996). 
Theoretical and Empirical Limitations
However, existing explanations and evidence on illusory correlations converge in a 
number of theoretical and empirical limitations. First, and most crucially, it is taken for 
granted in nearly all articles published so far that the underlying cognitive process involves 
correlation assessment proper. It is presupposed that participants form a stereotypical 
correlation from joint observations of group members and positive or negative behaviors. 
Thus, for any positive or negative behavior encountered, it is essential to know the group 
reference. If this condition is not met, no correlation can be determined. In our view, 
explaining illusory correlations with correlation assessment proper unnecessarily restricts the 
range of real life situations that can be explained.
Second, all pertinent research so far has operationalized the formation of illusory 
stereotypes as a completely passive, experimenter-determined observation process. 
Participants are not allowed to make active inferences or predictions and they do not receive 
dynamic feedback to their own inferences and intermediate judgments. This restriction is 
certainly not representative of the way in which stereotypes are learned in reality. Assuming a 
more active or interactive process, biased inferences probably have unwanted consequences 
that might “correct” the illusion. For example, an inflated rate of predicting negative 
behaviors for the minority as compared to majority should be disconfirmed by corrective 
feedback, mostly portraying the minority as not that negative. If it can be shown that the 
illusion will nevertheless appear in such a dynamic feedback environment, this would provide 
particularly strong evidence for its external validity. 
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A third limitation refers to the long-term stability of stereotypes. Virtually all published 
experiments include a limited number of observations between 36 and 48 behavior 
descriptions (for an exception see Fiedler, Hemmeter, Hofmann, 1974). It is unclear, both 
theoretically and empirically (cf. Mullen & Johnson, 1990, p. 24), whether the illusion would 
survive a more extended learning process. After all, both the distinctiveness of rare events, 
and the lesser opportunity to learn about the minority, might loose their impact when the 
number of observations increases substantially. However, if the illusory correlation 
phenomenon is to account for enduring stereotypes, it is essential to demonstrate that illusory 
correlations remain stable across a large number of learning trials. 
Goals of Present Research
In the present research, we try to tackle all three limitations. We demonstrate that a 
cognitive process more widely applicable than correlation assessment, denoted 
pseudocontingencies (PC), can produce illusory discrimination between majority and minority 
groups. Moreover, this process is shown to result in a stable illusion over a very large number 
of observations. And finally, this holds even for interactive task conditions involving 
predictions and corrective feedback. First, let us introduce the notion of pseudocontingencies 
(PCs) as an alternative process to correlation judgments.
Pseudocontingencies in illusory correlations
PCs are correlation inferences driven by base rate information. In the context illusory 
correlations, base rates refer to the occurrence rates of the two groups and the prevalence of 
positive and negative behaviors. In this context, a PC is implicated when one group is more 
prevalent than the other, and when one valence is more prevalent than the other. The 
alignment of the group and valence base rates determines the PC inference: observations of 
the frequent (rare) value on one attribute coincide with the frequent (rare) value on the other  
attribute. 
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To illustrate the differences between PCs and correlation assessment proper, consider 
the stimulus distribution depicted in Table 1. Over as many as 320 observations, the joint 
frequencies of positive and negative behaviors in the purple, majority group are 180 (+) and 
60 (–), respectively. The corresponding joint frequencies for the orange, minority group are 
60 (+) and 20 (–), respectively. A normatively correct correlation inference would have to use 
these cell frequencies (Allan, 1993; Fiedler, 2000), which indicate the distribution of one 
variable as a function of different levels of the other variable (e.g., the rate of positive 
behaviors conditional on a group). In contrast, PCs take the alignment of base rates for a 
correlation. The (statistically unwarranted) tendency to infer that valence (+ vs. –) is 
contingent on groups (purple vs. orange) is derived from an alignment of the skewed base-rate 
distributions in the marginals of the frequency table. Given unequal base rates of 240 and 80 
for groups and 240 and 80 for behaviors, respectively, the more frequent group is aligned with 
the more frequent valence level, thus resulting in the PC inference that the purple group is 
associated with + and, likewise, the orange group is associated with –.
A PC account of more favorable majority than minority judgments applies to a wider 
range of real life learning conditions than a traditional illusory-correlation account. PC 
inferences are still possible when the number of observations is too small to allow for 
correlation assessment proper. Fewer observations are needed to detect unequal group and 
valence base rates than to detect a correlation, that is, the differential rates of positive and 
negative valence as a function of groups. 
Another reason why PCs can be inferred when correlation assessment is impossible, in 
addition to limited number of observations, is that information about groups and valence may 
be dissociated. Very often, the social environment does not provide joint observations about 
group membership and valence. We may rather learn that a majority group is larger than a 
minority group on one occasion and, on a completely different occasion, that positive 
behavior is more prevalent than negative behavior. They may not receive joint information 
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about whether positive and negative behavior is paired with the majority or minority group. In 
this case, the correlation is unspecified, although PCs are still possible. Indeed, there is 
evidence on illusory stereotypes (McGarty, Haslam, Turner & Oakes, 1993) and on 
contingency illusions more generally (Fiedler & Freytag, 2004), showing unjustified 
discrimination between groups in the absence of joint observations. Thus, PCs explain 
illusory discrimination between majorities and minorities under a wider range of 
environmental conditions than traditional accounts of illusory correlations.
Present experiments and modifications
All three experiments reported in this article share the same basic set up. They consist 
of a learning phase and, immediately afterwards, an evaluation phase. On every trial of the 
learning phase, the label for one of two groups is presented, followed by valenced behavior 
descriptions. The joint frequencies of group labels and behaviors appear in Table 1. We 
conserve all crucial properties of stimulus distributions used to demonstrate illusory 
correlations, namely, skewed base rates of group and valence and a zero correlation between 
the attributes. In the subsequent evaluation phase, attitude ratings towards the groups are 
assessed independently for the more and less frequently observed group.
From the first to the last experiment, we gradually introduce three modifications of the 
standard frequency-based illusory correlation paradigm. In doing so, we address the three 
limitations outlined above: whether illusory correlations (a) show long-term stability, (b) are 
maintained given the participants’ active involvement and their corrective feedback, and (c) 
persist when only PCs provide a reasonable explanation. 
Extended stimulus series. In all three experiments, we increase the number of stimulus 
observations far beyond the amount of information used in prior research. Participants 
experience 320 trials in which unidentified members of either the majority (240 trials) or the 
minority (80 trials) show a positive (240) or a negative (80) behavior. 
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The purpose for extending the stimulus series is, obviously, to demonstrate the long-
term stability of the illusion. However, if the illusory discrimination of groups turns out to 
persist over more than 300 trials, this would not only provide evidence for temporal stability. 
It would also highlight the fact that the illusion survives in the face of a very large sample of 
observations that converges to a plain zero contingency. Because PCs reflect only aligned 
base rates, even a greatly extended stimulus series that maintains the base rates should not 
reduce the illusory correlation effect. Thus, extending the domain of illusory correlations to 
the case of very long and exhaustive intergroup experience testifies to the robustness of the 
phenomenon and at the same time supports a PC-based interpretation. 
Predictions of valence. Whereas the extension of the stimulus series is the novel feature 
of Experiment 1, Experiments 2 and 3 replace the passive observation task that characterizes 
previous studies by a more active or interactive prediction task. From the first trial on, 
participants are asked to predict the valence of the upcoming behavior given the group 
membership as predictor. 
This change in the task setting is meant to reflect how stereotypes are usually formed 
and used in real life. We refer to situations in which the group membership of a person that is 
known beforehand is used to predict the valence of that person’s behavior. In Experiment 2, 
we demonstrate that the illusory correlations generalize from purely memory-based judgments 
analyzed in virtually all previous studies to a new task setting involving the active formation 
of expectancies and continuous predictions. Group discrimination in such an active task 
setting would disconfirm the suspicion that illusory correlations are confined to memory 
instructions as opposed to instructions encouraging impression formation during stimulus 
encoding (REF xxxx). 
Corrective feedback. In Experiment 3 participants additionally receive corrective 
feedback for their predictions. That is, for every correct prediction, participants receive a pay-
off of 3 cents; for every incorrect prediction, they loose the same amount of 3 cents. The 
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purpose of introducing payoffs was twofold. First, we model situations in which stereotype 
formation and usage is not only interactive, but also of personal relevance. Second, for the 
reasons discussed below, this modification might yield even stronger evidence for the 
robustness of illusory correlations and for an interpretation in terms of PCs. 
Providing feedback and reinforcements participants’ predictions creates operant 
learning conditions. Under these conditions, the predictions themselves provide a natural 
online measure of correlation judgments (Allen, 1993). An illusory correlation effect is 
reflected in a higher rate of predicting the frequent valence for the frequent group than for the 
infrequent group. In an operant task context, such an illusory prediction bias reduces the 
overall amount of reinforcement. The maximal pay-off would be obtained by always 
predicting the more frequent valence, irrespective of the group. If the participants’ online 
predictions nevertheless discriminate between groups, this would reflect a particularly robust 
manifestation of an illusory correlation effect, which persists despite a counter-active pay-off 
scheme. 
Moreover, the online manifestation of the illusion can be determined at any segment of 
the operant-learning process. Monitoring the development of the illusion across the entire 
stimulus series allows for extrapolating inferences. If the size of the illusion reaches a stable 
asymptote, this would provide particularly strong evidence for robustness and stability. In a 
non-social matching-to-sample paradigm, we already obtained first evidence for a similar 
illusion after extended corrective feedback (Kutzner, Freytag, Vogel, & Fiedler, 2008). 
To summarize, the present research extends illusory correlations, both theoretically and 
empirically. We try to provide evidence for PCs as a theoretical explanation. Within such an 
explanatory framework, illusory correlations can be predicted even under conditions of 
limited information that does not warrant genuine correlation assessment. Additionally, we try 
to show the robustness of the illusion my introducing various ecologically plausible 
modifications of the standard illusory correlation paradigm. We greatly increase the number 
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of stimulus observations and involve participants in active predictions and by providing them 
incentives for accurate responses.
Hypotheses
We hypothesize that even after many observations (i.e. 320) the more frequently 
observed group (i.e. the majority) will be evaluated more in line with the more frequent 
valence of behaviors than the minority. When participants make predictions under operant-
learning conditions, we expect a tendency to more frequently predict the frequent type of 
behavior for the majority as compared to the minority (Exp. 3). This effect should be 
manifested in the predictions, notwithstanding the monetary incentives for accurate 
predictions. As we expect the illusions in the online predictions and in the final judgments and 
evaluations to reflect the same basic process, we expect the novel bias in the online 
predictions to correlate systematically with the memory-based judgments and evaluations at 
the end of all observations.
******
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 we closely replicated standard frequency based illusory correlation 
paradigms. However, we extended the number of observations to 320. 
Method
Participants and Design. Twenty-one undergraduate students (11 female, 10 male) from 
the University of Mannheim participated in the study for a compensation of 4€. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of the two conditions with different types of frequent behaviors. 
Either positive or negative behaviors were more frequent, at a ratio of three to one. Every 
subject was exposed to the two different types of groups, the majority and the minority. 
Observations relating to the majority were also three times as frequent as those relating to the 
minority (cf. Table 1). The groups did not differ in the ratio of good and bad behaviors. This 
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resulted in a 2 (frequent behavior positive vs. negative) x 2 (majority vs. minority) mixed 
design with repeated measures on the latter factor. 
Procedure. Participants were informed that they would have to form an accurate 
impression about two groups over a series of observations. To move from trial to trial 
participants had to press a key on their keyboard. We referred to the groups as the “Purple 
group” and the “Orange group.” When the labels appeared on the screen they were 
accompanied by a corresponding hue as background of the screen and the keyboard was 
locked for 1.0 s. When subjects had pressed one of the keys, valenced behavioral descriptions 
appeared next to the group label for 3.0 s, creating joint observations of group label and 
valence. We used 128 behavioral descriptions that had been pretested for their valence. For 
example, a negatively valenced description would read “A member the purple/orange group 
uses vast amounts of pesticides in his garden,” a positive “A member the orange/orange group 
can laugh about his own weaknesses.” After 0.3 s without group label or behavioral 
descriptions visible on the screen, the next group label appeared. 
To compose the sequence of 320 trials, for every subject the computer generated 20 
random sequences each consisting of 16 trials that retained the statistical properties of the 
distribution in Table 1. These 20 sequences were adjoined to produce the full 320 trial 
sequence.
After this training phase, participants indicated their overall impression of the two 
groups rating both groups on likeability and their intentions to spend time with members of 
each group. Computers delivered the instructions, controlled stimulus presentation, and 
recorded participants’ evaluations.
Results and Discussion
We submitted the evaluations of the groups to a two-factor repeated-measures analysis 
of variance with type of frequent behavior as the between-subject factor (positive vs. 
negative) and type of group as the within-subject factor (majority vs. minority). The analysis 
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revealed a marginally significant main effect for the valence factor (F(1, 19) = 3.59, p=.07, η² 
= .16) and a marginal interaction (F(1, 19) = 3.13, p=.09, η² = .14). As Figure 1 shows, the 
more frequent group, the majority, was preferred if the more frequent behavior was positive 
and the less frequent group, the minority, was preferred when the less frequent behavior was 
positive. Looking at the average effect size of r² = .14, the results closely match those of 
Mullen and Johnson’s (1990) meta-analysis (r² = .12).
Insert Figure 1 about here
As compared to standard illusory correlation paradigms, in Experiment 1 we increased 
the number of observations to address the long-term stability of the illusion. We found that 
still after 320 trials a preference persisted for the majority when positive behavior was more 
frequent and for the minority when negative behavior was more frequent. These results are 
first evidence for the long-term stability of the illusory correlation and with that for PCs as a 
possible explanation.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was a first step to move away from the completely passive, experimenter-
determined observation task of merely observing group members and behaviors. Before the 
behaviors could be observed, participants were asked to predict their valence given the group 
membership as predictor. To mimic that stereotype judgments might be made based on very 
few observations, we asked participants to make predictions from the first trial on.
Method
Participants and design. Twenty-three undergraduate students (15 female, 8 male) from 
the University of Mannheim participated in the study for a compensation of 4€. We employed 
the same stimulus distribution (cf. Table 1) as in Experiment 1 with the same 2 (frequent 
behavior positive vs. negative) x 2 (majority vs. minority) mixed design with repeated 
measures on the latter factor.
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Procedure. As in Experiment 1, participants were informed that they would have to 
form an accurate impression about two groups over a series of observations. This time 
however, they were additionally instructed that to do so they had to predict whether group 
members would show positive or negative behaviors on the next observation. They did so by 
pressing one of two response keys on the left or the right side of a German computer 
keyboard. The meaning of the keys remained constant over the course of the experiment but 
was counterbalanced between subjects. After the prediction, the predefined behavioral 
description appeared on the screen together with the group label. In contrast to the next study, 
subjects’ predictions were not followed by explicit feedback as to whether their predictions 
were correct or incorrect and had no consequences for their reward. The same group labels 
and behavioral descriptions as in Experiment 1 were used. 
After this training phase, participants indicated their overall impression of the two 
groups by answering the same evaluation questions as in Experiment 1. Again, computers 
delivered the instructions, controlled the stimulus presentation of the 320 observations, and 
recorded participants’ choices.
Results and Discussion
We analyzed the predictions by forming blocks of 32 trials. We computed the 
proportion of predictions for the more frequently presented valence conditional on the type of 
group presented before. These proportions were submitted to a three-factor repeated-measures 
analysis of variance with valence of frequent behavior as the between-subject factor (positive 
vs. negative) and block (1-10) and type of group as within-subject factors (majority vs. 
minority). The analysis revealed a strong main effect for the between subject factor, type of 
frequent behavior (F(1, 21)=11.85, p<.001, η² = .88) indicating a more pronounced tendency 
to predict the frequent type behavior if the frequent type was positive (all interactions with 
type of frequent behavior F’s < 1.5, ns.). No other effect was significant, neither the main 
effect for block, F(9, 13) = 1.97, p=.128, η² = .58, nor the main effect for type of group, F(1, 
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21)< 1, nor the interaction between type of group and block (F(9,13)< 1). Figure 2 shows the 
mean choice proportions for the more frequent behavior conditional on the type of group. 
Insert Figure 2 about here
We submitted the evaluations of the groups obtained after predictions to a two-factor 
repeated-measures analysis of variance with type of frequent behavior as the between-subject 
factor (positive vs. negative) and type of group as the within-subject factor (majority vs. 
minority). The analysis revealed a main effect for the valence factor (F(1, 21) = 6.72, p<.05, 
η² = .24) and an interaction (F(1, 21) = 5.49, p<.05, η² = .21). As Figure 3 shows, the more 
frequent group, the majority, was preferred if the more frequent behavior was positive and the 
less frequent group, the minority, was preferred when the less frequent behavior was positive. 
Looking at the average effect size r² = .21, this time the illusory correlations are even stronger 
than in Mullen and Johnson’s (1990) meta-analysis (r² = .12).
Insert Figure 3 about here
To predict the illusory correlation obtained from the evaluations by the illusion inherent 
to the predictions we computed difference scores. For the evaluations we obtained an illusory 
correlation measure by subtracting the evaluation of the minority from that of the majority if 
the frequent valence of behaviors was positive and vice versa if the frequent valence was 
negative. To obtain an illusory correlation measure for the predictions, we computed the 
difference scores for each of the 10 blocks. We subtracted the proportions of predictions for 
the frequent type of behavior after the majority from the proportions after the minority. We 
built an average prediction correlation judgment by averaging the 10 subsequent difference 
scores (α=.94). A correlation analysis revealed that the prediction correlation judgment did 
not correlate with the illusory discrimination in evaluations of the groups (r(23)=.16, ns.). 
In Experiment 2, participants were actively involved in the task by predicting the 
valence of behaviors, again, over an extended number of observations. The illusory 
correlations also proved robust against this ecologically plausible modification. Participants 
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exhibited a preference for majority when the frequent behavior was more frequent and for the 
minority when negative behavior was more frequent. These results extend the evidence that 
PCs might underlie illusory correlations under interactive task conditions. 
Experiment 3
In the last experiment, we built upon Experiment 2 and further increased participants’ 
involvement by reinforcing correct predictions. Crucially, this enabled us to monitor the 
acquisitions process of the illusory correlation and to address the question whether further 
observations would have reduced the illusion.
Method
Participants and design. Thirty-seven undergraduate students (21 female, 16 male) from 
the Universities of Heidelberg and Mannheim participated in the study for performance-
contingent reward that averaged around 4€. Design and stimulus distributions were identical 
to Experiments 1 and 2. Subjects were randomly assigned to the 2 (frequent behavior positive 
vs. negative) x 2 (majority vs. minority) mixed design with repeated measures on the latter 
factor.
Procedure. This time, participants were informed that they could win money making 
correct predictions about the valence of the member’s behavior. If the predefined valence was 
predicted, 0.03€ were added to the subjects account. In the case predictions did not match the 
valence of the behavioral description, 0.03€ were subtracted.  The updated account value and 
the last change were constantly displayed in the lower right corner of the screen.
After this training phase, participants again indicated their overall impression of the two 
groups. The rest of the procedure was identical to the previous experiments. 
Results and Discussion
We analyzed the predictions by forming blocks of 32 trials. We computed the 
proportion of predictions for the more frequently presented valence conditional on the type of 
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group presented before. These proportions were submitted to a three-factor repeated-measures 
analysis of variance with valence of frequent behavior as the between-subject factor (positive 
vs. negative) and block (1-10) and type of group as within-subject factors (majority vs. 
minority). The analysis revealed a marginal main effect for the between subject factor, type of 
frequent behavior (F(1,35)=3.88, p=.06, η² = .10) indicating a more pronounced tendency to 
predict the frequent type behavior if the frequent type was positive (all interactions with type 
of frequent behavior F’s < 1.4, ns.) and a strong main effect for block, F(9, 27) = 15.70, 
p<.001, η² = .84. Crucially, we obtained a main effect for type of group, F(1, 35) = 14.45, 
p<.01, η² = .21, that did not depend on the block, i.e. there was no interaction between type of 
group and block (F < 1). Figure 4 shows the mean choice proportions for the more frequent 
behavior conditional on the type of group. 
Additionally, we performed two analyses to address a possible change in the size of the 
type-of-group effect. First, we analyzed the difference in predictions rates in the last block. A 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed that still for the last 32 predictions there was the 
tendency to predict more of the frequent behavior for the majority than for the minority 
(F(1,36)=5.17, p<.05, η² = .13). Second, we compared the difference in predictions rates for 
the first and last block of 32 trials. With just these two blocks, a 2-factor repeated measures 
ANOVA showed a strong main effect for block, F(1, 36) = 102.70, p<.001, η² = .74, a main 
effect for type of group, F(1, 36) = 10.62, p<.01, η² = .23, and, crucially, no interaction 
between type of group and block (F < .12).
Insert Figure 4 about here
As before, we also submitted the evaluations of the groups to a two-factor repeated-
measures analysis of variance with type of frequent behavior as the between-subject factor 
(positive vs. negative) and type of group as the within-subject factor (majority vs. minority). 
The analysis revealed a main effect for the valence factor (F(1, 35) = 7.64, p<.01, η² = .18) 
and an interaction (F(1, 35) = 19.64, p<.001, η² = .36). As Figure 5 shows, the more frequent 
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group, the majority, was preferred if the more frequent behavior was positive and the less 
frequent group, the minority, was preferred when the less frequent behavior was positive.
Insert Figure 5 about here
To predict the illusory correlation obtained from the evaluations by the illusion inherent 
to the predictions we computed difference scores. For the evaluations we obtained an illusory 
correlation measure by subtracting the evaluation of the minority from that of the majority if 
the frequent valence of behaviors was positive and vice versa if the frequent valence was 
negative. To obtain an illusory correlation measure for the predictions two steps were 
necessary. First, we computed the difference scores for each of the 10 blocks. We subtracted 
the proportions of predictions for the frequent type of behavior after the majority from the 
proportions after the minority. Then, we analyzed the internal consistency of these 10 
subsequent correlation judgments. Corrected item-total correlations revealed that the first two 
judgments did only correlate weakly with the total (r’s<.25). Therefore, we constructed two 
average correlation judgments, for the first two blocks (r(37)=.68, p<.001) and the following 
eight blocks (α=.85). The scales did not correlate (r(37)=.08, ns.). 
The main regression analysis revealed that both correlation judgments together 
explained 26% of the variance in the illusory discrimination in evaluations of the groups 
(F(2,34)=5.99, p<.01). Both, early and late correlation judgments separately predicted the 
illusory discrimination (β=.33, p<.05 and β=.35, p<.05, for the first two blocks and the 
following eight respectively).
In this last experiment, we increased the personal relevance of correct predictions by 
introducing reinforcement-learning conditions. This provides a completely new measure of 
illusory correlations, participants’ predictions of valence given the groups. Parallel to the 
evaluations of the groups, this behavioral measure also revealed stable illusory correlations. 
Interestingly, though unpredicted, early and late correlation judgments in the predictions did 
not correlate. This suggests that participants differ in when they most show the illusion.
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Additionally, given the characteristics of the acquisitions process it is unlikely that 
further observations would have reduced the illusion. Most importantly, because the size of 
the illusion did not depend on when it was assessed, after 32 or 320 observations. Also 
supporting the idea that learning had stabilized, from Figure 3 it seems that predictions rates 
did remain constant after half of the observations. Thus, as predicted by the PC, illusory 
correlations show long-term stability even in the face of personally relevant corrective 
feedback.  
General Discussion
In the present research we extend the validity of illusory correlations (Hamilton & 
Gifford, 1976) as an analogue of how majority-minority stereotypes are formed in real life. 
On the one hand, we provide evidence for an explanation, namely pseudocontingencies (PCs, 
Fiedler, Freytag & Meiser, 2008), that captures a wider range of ecological conditions under 
which these stereotypes might be formed. On the other hand, we generate additional evidence 
for illusory correlations under ecologically plausible modifications of the standard task.
PCs in illusory correlations
PCs are correlation judgments that rely on aligned base rates, in other words on the fact 
that for the two attributes to be correlated some observations are more frequent than others. In 
illusory correlations, the frequent attributes are (a) the majority and (b) either positive or 
negative valence of behavior. Given these aligned base rates, PCs link the frequent 
observations and the infrequent observations, thereby creating the illusion of a correlation. 
Unlike explanations that rely on correlation assessment proper, PCs predict this illusory 
correlation disregarding information about the pairings of group members and valence. 
Only PCs predict illusory correlations in situations where there is only limited 
information about the majority and, even more plausibly, about the minority. For example, if 
no minority members have been observed performing clearly positive or negative behaviors, 
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no correlation between group and valence can be determined. Beyond plausibility, there is 
suggestive evidence that people actually make stereotypic judgments without joint 
observations ((McGarty et al., 1993; Fiedler & Freytag, 2004). But even if joint observations 
are available, but information is limited in terms of the number of observations, PCs enjoy an 
advantage. Every observation entails all the information necessary to update both base rate 
estimates, of groups and valence, but only half the information needed to estimate the two 
conditional base rates of valence given one or the other group. Thus, PCs explain majority-
minority stereotype formation even if very little is known about the groups in question.
What might seem paradoxical given this limited-information advantage, PCs also imply 
that even extensive experience with group members paired with valence will not eliminate the 
illusion. This is due to the fact that PCs are only sensitive to base rate information, i.e. how 
often groups and positive or negative behaviors are observed. In this clear-cut form, only PCs 
make this prediction. For example, Mullen and Johnson (1990), favoring distinctiveness-
based explanation, concluded that either stronger or weaker illusory correlations might have 
occurred with an increasing number of observations (p.24). 
Consequently, we conducted experiments in which we drastically increased the number 
of observations. All three experiments demonstrated illusory correlations in stereotype 
formation regarding two fictitious groups even after 320 observations. That is we found more 
positive attitude ratings for the majority if the “majority” of behaviors was positive and for 
the minority of the “minority” of behaviors was positive. Crucially, based on the monitoring 
of the learning process of the stereotype in Experiment 3, we argue that further increasing the 
number of observations would not have eliminated the illusion. This provides strong evidence 
that aligned base rates, i.e. PCs, not joint observations of groups and valence explain part of 
the illusory correlation.
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Table 1
Table 1. Contingency tables indicating the predetermined distributions used in the 
experiments.  The  base  rates  of  both  predictors  (group  labels)  and  correct 
predictions (valence of behavior) were skewed at a ratio of 3:1.
Experiments 1 & 2
Correct prediction
Positive behavior Negative behavior
Predictor
Purple group 180 60 240
Orange group 60 20 80
240 80 320
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Figure 1. Mean evaluations of the groups (majority and minority) after 320 trials as a function 
of the type of the more frequent behavior (positive or negative). Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean.
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Figure 2. Mean conditional choice proportions for the more frequently presented behavior as a 
function of the type of group (majority or minority) on the trial. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean.
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Figure 3. Mean evaluations of the groups (majority and minority) after 320 of not monetarily 
reinforced predictions as a function of the type of the more frequent behavior (positive or 
negative). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 4
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Figure 4. Mean conditional choice proportions for the more frequently presented behavior as a 
function of the type of group (majority or minority) on the trial. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean.
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Figure 5. Mean evaluations of the groups (majority and minority) after 320 predictions as a 
function of the type of the more frequent behavior (positive or negative). Error bars represent 
the standard error of the mean. 
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